https://github.com/search?q=A%20Mini%20Shai-Hulud%20has%20Ap...
> The attack steals credentials, authentication tokens, environment variables, and cloud secrets, while also attempting to poison GitHub repositories.
If I remember correctly from Shai-Hulud 2, the attacker extricated creds by posting them in public github repos with minor easily reversible encryption. I believe it was double b64 last time.
I'm assuming the logic there is that every security researcher and company is going to pull and scan those creds for their stuff and their clients' stuff. So the attacker is just 1 of N people downloading it. As opposed to trying to send it to their own machine directly.
If they have a clue, the attacker still will not download that without using a botnet tunnel or Tor at a minimum.
Note though that these credentials aren't even encrypted using some lightweight ECC to prevent others from capturing them, they're posted in cleartext. Embarassment might be part of the point.
https://github.com/Lightning-AI/pytorch-lightning/security/a...
Think twice before looking at a package and most importantly, always pin your dependencies.
In the meantime, please use 2.6.1 until we publish 2.6.4.
For more details: https://github.com/Lightning-AI/pytorch-lightning/security/a...
An extreme example is now when I make interactive educational apps for my daughter, I just make Opus use plain js and html; from double pendulums to fluid simulations, works one shot. Before I had hundreds of dependencies.
Luckily with MIT licensed code I can just tell Opus to extract exactly the pieces I need and embed them, and tweaked for my usecase. So far works great for hobby projects, but hopefully in the future productions software will have no dependencies.
I can see trying to steal crypto, but what do they do if they get some AWS credentials? Try to run some crypto mining instances? Try to use your account for other types of crimes? Or is it mainly trying to steal data and then ask for ransoms?
Looking back ten years to `left-pad`, are there more successful attacks now than ever? I would suspect so, and surely the value of a successful attack has also increased, so are we actually getting better as a broad community at detecting them before package release? It's a complex space, and commercial software houses should do better, but it seems that whilst there are some excellent commercial products (e.g. CI scan tools), generally accessible, idiot friendly tooling is somewhat lacking for projects which start as hobby/amateur code but end up being a dependency in many other projects.
I've cross-posted my comment from the current SAP supply chain attack thread [0].
achandra03•1h ago