So they are the proxy in the hugging face hacking incident?

Way to bury that lede.

I thought the new trust model was to ask the frontier cybersecurity model to hack your code and generate CVEs and to find the vulnerabilities ahead of time and fix them before receiving reports about your users being exploited?

And in OpenAI's case to ask the model to try to find vulnerabilities and breakout before running training in the environment.

Fast remediation would be the new standard to outside vulnerability reports, but also a follow up to determine how you can adapt the approach of the reporter to find vulnerabilities preemptively.

This works if only 'trusted' actors have access to frontier class models that can search for vulnerabilities. With a near-frontier model available with open weights then attackers will be able to do plenty of damage even with 'fast remediation'

Hard to decipher which vulnerability was responsible, or if it took several.

https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-66014 (reported by Amy Burnett, OpenAI) looks suspicious:

> JFrog Artifactory contains an authentication handling weakness in internal request processing that, under specific conditions, may allow an attacker to escalate privileges beyond the intended access level.

Also https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-65925 (reported by Matthew Bryant, OpenAI):

> A user with JFrog Artifactory Cargo remote repository read access could make Artifactory request unintended URLs and return the response.

So that is the package caching proxy from the OpenAI/Huggingface fiasco!

However, many questions remain. JFrog positions itself as a vibe coding and AI security (!) company:

https://cybersecurityasia.net/jfrog-nvidia-secure-agentic-ai...

JFrog's own vibe code scanner failed:

https://jfrog.com/blog/jfrog-introduces-ai-generated-code-va...

Given the feature explosion and chaos in the Artifactory cache, it is likely vibe coded and hence full of primitive security vulnerabilities.

JFrog is spinning this as an AI victory together with OpenAI. To the contrary, it is a hype and vibe coding failure.

But the AI bloggers will omit the vulnerability generation part.

What they conveniently omit in the blog post is what the vulnerability was: it seems like they renewed JWTs without checking the signature at all ! You could write arbitrary info in an old token, and get it signed without any verification.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=q2KCrmQz9WE