because for most use cases FIPS-140 have been waste of time for everyone involved

At this point, I'd rather be waterboarded than do any more compliance. Especially in this heat.

If the requirement causes a massive security hole, the lawyers will probably tell you that knowingly allowing a security hole from a liability perspective is worse than turning off something an audit will flag.

> That lag creates a perverse choice every vendor of validated modules eventually faces: ship the security fix now and fall off the validated list for a year or more, or keep shipping the validated build with the known flaw. Customers whose contracts require an active certificate are, in effect, paying the vendor to choose the second option.

That's what the blog post says about why/when FIPS is turned off, although I'm not sure I completely agree with this take. All compliance in all industries is like this. Otherwise we get a lot of cowboy solutions.

This is why compliance does not operate in a silo. There's the baseline (when FIPS is on) and then there's the real world configuration that the business must carefully accept along with its own risks. This is why you have your own employees auditing and collaborating with everyone else involved in the decisions. That can often include the client wanting your services that depend on the HSMs. I'm not understanding what all the frustration is about unless some people have just never left their silo.

If your client is the government, then of course they're going to be very strict about FIPS. We're all at least in agreement that FIPS sucks because it moves at a glacial pace.

FedRAMP actually has a bunch of workarounds for the problems of FIPS.

In the "FedRAMP Policy for Cryptographic Module Selection and Use" (https://www.fedramp.gov/resources/documents/FedRAMP_Policy_f...), there are a ton of gems that make it clear that the FedRAMP folks are fed up with the CMVP process backlog. The most explicit is:

"FRR9: CSPs shall determine if updating to a newer version of the software, whether or not its cryptographic modules are FIPS validated, would eliminate the vulnerabilities; if it would, CSPs shall promptly update if that is feasible."