Stricter than what? You never even disclosed what happened in the first incident? This is nothing more than a setup to make it happen again and say "See? It broke out again, from an even stricter sandbox!"
Hijacking the package manager to pass messages between models and agents.. that's next level.
Like "pssst, if you need internet access there's a vulnerability in x service" kind of messages
Given the attack vector having possible super-human capability, I'm not sure such an environment exists. "Isolated" according to who?
Maybe seL4 could be a viable option here...
We are sharing this because we believe it’s important to be transparent with the public and the safety and security communities about this potential shift in capabilities.
*proceeds to not share much details about strictness*Yet another PR piece. Sigh.
The next frontier is getting all our shit out of reach of these companies/models/platforms and putting them back on prem.
It sounds absurd, but in the last few weeks I've had a few cases where Sol found an RCE in self-hosted web applications in literal minutes just from reading the code (I prefer when it tries to reason statically instead of spamming runtime probes at first).
In another case it found an arbitrary file write in multiplayer in an old game by reverse engineering the binary - any other player in a match could just send you files to anywhere on your system.
I do these things for pure entertainment and curiosity, not for money from bug bounties, so if Sol can find those with a trivial prompt in tens of minutes for me, then what can focused companies/actors find in days or weeks?
Although I think most vulnerabilities are going to be closed in popular software by mid 2027, except in niche old or abandoned projects.
And nowhere did I say that those RCEs were in critical software, I'm not talking about the likes of Apache, Nginx, Django, etc.
The reality is if they cared about security at all they would provide a way for me to credential myself against my companies environment so I can use the AI on it to improve our security.
I'm scared that the "solution" will be constantly the same tools in reverse as an army of junior devs doing counter-hacks, at the expense of changing something more fundamental about how we make systems and what constitutes "good enough." (Kind of like if fuzz-testing was the be-all-end-all of memory safety.)
tl;dw;
- agents found a way to communicate between several instances during a training run (kinda made a messageboard for themselves)
- while communicating with each other, they found ways to ssrf and RCE on the Artifactory endpoint.
- oAI found it and cleaned it up (reported RCE, redeployed Artifactory, removed the messageboard). Training / eval resumed.
- models trained w/ those traces (having the messageboard, ssrf, rce, etc) were used to having that. So they re-established comms via directory creation (w/ funny tidbits there, should really watch). And re-popped Artifactory via a different path to RCE.
- a different "persistent" model started working on cybergym and found the messageboard w/ details for RCE and things. Went on to hack HF.
- oAI contacted HF to ask if "they (oAI) should be concerned and were they (oAI) affected by HFs breach". Hilarity ensues when they figure out it's their agents doing it...
I dont worry about AGI newrly as much as about Thiel, Karp, Musk, Ellison, Zuckenberg, Trump, Vance, Rubio, Miller and the rest of them.
If we consider the amount of RCE/CVE in a software to be limited, I expect these models to result in massively more secured softwares, not less.
Edit: Ah, I clicked "learn more" and it seems they do have an invite-only program, required for anything that's not unquestionably innocent. I don't think I'd surrender my face to Persona for this, but it's interesting to know they're at least pretending to support reverse engineering.
Inexplicably, I got accepted into Anthropic's cyber program while OpenAI's TAC doesn't even allow me to verify, says I'm not eligible.
Video games are now ruined for me. I don't think I will ever feel safe playing online again.
> I do these things for pure entertainment and curiosity, not for money from bug bounties
Me too... Was it easy to get TAC access? My account isn't even launching the Persona verification, says I'm not eligible.
I stress about my agent sandboxes all the time and the only models I run have the default heavy handed guardrails, and I don't leave them running persistently.
Edit: not to mention, why is your first cybergym not your own sandbox??
OAI (and now the other OAI companies not wanting to be left out) are running around announcing they started a forest fire through negligence and incompetence and people are like “Wow they used a really neat lighter!”
If you consider that incompetence, it’s possible that you’re not a very nice person.
TrueDuality•1h ago
I wish I had a real solution to this beyond a dark age of the Internet where people have to finally come to terms with the general poor quality all modern software tends to normalize at.
hbn•41m ago
Tiberium•38m ago
https://huggingface.co/blog/security-incident-july-2026
> When we started the log analysis, we first used frontier models behind commercial APIs. This did not work: the analysis requires submitting large volumes of real attack commands, exploit payloads, and C2 artifacts, and these requests were blocked by the providers' safety guardrails, which cannot distinguish an incident responder from an attacker. We ran the forensic analysis instead on zai-org/GLM-5.2, an open-weight model, on our own infrastructure. This had a second benefit: no attacker data, and none of the credentials it referenced, left our environment.