Here's a renewal of one, presumably basic, license:
https://bidbanana.thebidlab.com/contract/4jKIvKMvZdoWo3d6K6q...
The product is not publicly available, and is sold only B2G: https://www.magnetforensics.com/products/magnet-graykey/#par...
edit: having personally gone through this kind of mess, the correct solution is to use strict typing to make sure you keep track of the difference between times and durations and the difference between different clock types. Don’t use plain integers and also don’t try to fudge it the way that Go’s standard library solution does. The modern C++ library is actually pretty good, although you need to use very recent versions of the standard for full functionality.
As I understand it this encryption is a significant additional barrier to technical or legal access to those files. If someone knows otherwise, please let me know. Being wrong could cost me my home and life savings.
Good name.
Unless you are Norwegian royalty and are notified of your upcoming arrest, then you can wipe all you need.
GrapheneOS's default is 18 hours and it can be set to between 10 minutes and 72 hours. iPhones and Stock pixels have it non customizable at 72 hours.
On GrapheneOS, for privacy and convenience, it's best to use a long random passphrase [1] for your primary unlock and then a fingerprint with a second factor pin as the secondary unlock. You enter the passphrase every time the device restarts.
If you're encountering someone that's going to seize your phone, try to restart/shut it down yourself so you don't have to trust the AFU protections.
[1] https://strongphrase.net give memorable ones which is cool.
Shut down the phone in areas with a high snatch risk. That means during landing for example, because the aircraft can be boarded covertly if on the ground.
Why do you call out just one OS? It's a good idea for any OS.
IIRC, the default on iOS is that anyone with your locked device can enable airplane mode which is concerning simply for thieves. But I suppose they have to use faraday bags anyway because of the Find My network.
This is weird framing. The feature makes it harder for anyone to break into the device.
Me:
>What about a duress timer working as the reboot timer but it wipes if you don't unlock within the time period. Would that have any advantages for destruction of evidence or deniability?
HybridStatAnim8:
>That would not be viable because the hardware does not support it. It cannot be implemented in the OS because the OS can be turned off or exploited endlessly. For GOS to consider it, it would likely need to be backed by the secure element.
>Duress PIN is deemed acceptable to implement in the OS because it is expected that the user is the one to enter it, so it has not fallen into the hands of attackers who may bypass it. Once attackers have it, you are effectively gambling. Account for that in your threat model and do not let it get to that point.
Yes it's bad that the government overreaches, but it is also bad for your mental health to worry about it.
>CBP only searched the electronic devices of 55,318 international travelers,” the agency wrote, or 0.0013%.
would suck to be one of those 55 thousand people. I've never been bitten by a shark but I sure care about people that have?
It seems more like they're trying to determine that it is in fact a laptop and not something resembling one.
If you really want to keep this stuff on a phone at least stretch to a second phone and keep it somewhere safe.
Having thugs on speed dial opens a lot of doors.
Which covers divulging encryption keys because it is treated the same as compelling you to give up the combination to a wall safe which is testimonial and protected.
https://nccriminallaw.sog.unc.edu/2026/08/03/giving-police-a...
You can still be held in custody for obstruction of justice:
https://www.findlaw.com/legalblogs/third-circuit/man-held-in...
It took four years before he could secure his release:
https://www.sophos.com/en-us/blog/suspect-who-refused-to-dec...
Note that the recent high-profile case of a man being jailed involved him refusing to decrypt, rather than claiming he didn't know. He was deliberately trying to test the law regarding the permissible scope of inspection of digital data, to force the matter into the courts so the issues could be litigated in a controlled context untainted by other potential crimes; being arrested and charged was part of his plan.
>As I understand it this encryption is a significant additional barrier to technical or legal access to those files. If someone knows otherwise, please let me know. Being wrong could cost me my home and life savings.
Yes, it seems that way in the US: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=49922513
If your threat model includes someone using violence to coerce you, an option could be to use a cloud storage account entirely over Tor from the browser (preferably download the app because of web cryptography risks) with the login memorized. That way you can access it on any computer even if yours is lost and you can remove traces of it from your phone.
TazeTSchnitzel•1h ago