Speaking of, whatever came out of that? I don't see any related updates on that blog.

> uninformed speculation, panic, reddit levels of baseless accusation, and harassment of the developers

To be fair, it seems like the only way of avoiding something like that is never saying anything publicly. The crowds of the internet eagerly jump into any drama, vague or not, and balloon it regardless.

> I jest; the vagueposting led to [...]

Resurrecting a 4 month old issue that evaporated in a day or two seems like poor form to me.

Also I believe most of the responsibility for the negative behavior should be assigned to those actually engaging in it, not the initial post. I understand others reasonably disagree (notably about the accusation and harrassment).

Tbh, it sounds like you might have been personally affected? At any rate, I certainly don't condone a mob mentality.

The measure would probably be whether any of the reports led to examples of downstreams either syncing prior to release via security sharing they didn't already have established or any projects preparing to sync out of normal schedule ahead of time, regardless of if that's a small or large magnitude of change. How companies would prefer the public hear about a vulnerability has always been the lowest concern out of disclosures so I don't expect it to bring anything new here.

Google's products represent 3/6 of the initial vulnerabilities following this new reporting policy in the linked reporting page.

On the contrary: If Project Zero finds a 0-day in a product I know I use, and I know that product is Internet Facing, I can immediately take action and firewall it off. It isn't always the case that they find things like this, but an early warning signal can be really beneficial.

For customers, it also gives them leverage to contact vendors and ask politely for news on the patch.

There really isn't a great solution here. The notice that a vulnerability has been discovered puts even more pressure on the fix to be deployed as close to instantly as possible, throughout the entire supply chain.

Why is this? Especially for smaller or more stable open-source projects, the number of commits in a 90-day period that have the possibility to be security-relevant are likely to be quite low, perhaps as low as single digits. So the specific commit that fixes the reported security issue is highly likely to be identified immediately, and now there's a race to develop and use an exploit.

As one example, a stable project that's been the target of significant security hardening and analysis is the libpng decoder. Over the past 3 months (May 1 - Jul 29), its main branch has seen 41 total commits. Of those, at least 25 were non-code changes, involving documentation updates, release engineering activities, and build system / cross-platform support. If Project Zero had announced a vulnerability in this project on May 1 with a disclosure embargo of today, there would be at most 16 commits to inspect over 3 months to find the bug. That's not a lot of work for a dedicated team.

So now, do we delay publishing security fixes to public repos and try and maintain private infrastructure and testing for all of this? And then try and get a release made, propagated to multiple layers of downstream vendors, have them make releases, etc... all within a day or two? That's pretty hard, just organizationally. No great answers here.

Seems to be described a bit here https://www.androidauthority.com/how-google-built-tensor-g5-...

Shoring up the security of FOSS is not "killing FOSS slowly".

Closed source software doesn't get to benefit from the goodwill of the open source software community, which includes independent security researchers as well as orgs like P0.

I guess our disagreement can be distilled down to one question:

Why would an emphasis on closed source products help FOSS, and why would an emphasis on FOSS help closed source?

Because this seems backwards to me. Maybe it makes sense in public relations where vibes are more important than substance and nobody thinks for more than 100 milliseconds?