No other time in history has one single company been responsible for so much commerce and traffic. I wonder what some outage analogs to the pre-internet ages would be.
> The standard procedures the managers tried first failed to bring the network back up to speed and for nine hours, while engineers raced to stabilize the network, almost 50% of the calls placed through AT&T failed to go through.
> Until 11:30pm, when network loads were low enough to allow the system to stabilize, AT&T alone lost more than $60 million in unconnected calls.
> Still unknown is the amount of business lost by airline reservations systems, hotels, rental car agencies and other businesses that relied on the telephone network.
https://users.csc.calpoly.edu/~jdalbey/SWE/Papers/att_collap...
AWS very likely has Cloudflare beat in commerce responsibility. Amazon is equal to ~2.3% of US GDP by itself.
In the pre digital era, East India Company dwarfs every other company in any metric like commerce controlled, global shipping, communication traffic, private army size, %GDP , % of workforce employed by considerable margins.
The default was large consolidated organization throughout history, like say Bell Labs, or Standard Oil before that and so on, only for a brief periods we have enjoyed benefits of true capitalism.
[1] Although I suspect either AWS or MS/Azure recent down-times in the last couple of years are likely higher
- Their database permissions changed unexpectedly (??)
- This caused a 'feature file' to be changed in an unusual way (?!)
- Their SQL query made assumptions about the database; their permissions change thus resulted in queries getting additional results, permitted by the query
- Changes were propagated to production servers which then crashed those servers (meaning they weren't tested correctly)
- They hit an internal application memory limit and that just... crashed the app
- The crashing did not result in an automatic backout of the change, meaning their deployments aren't blue/green or progressive
- After fixing it, they were vulnerable to a thundering herd problem
- Customers who were not using bot rules were not affected; CloudFlare's bot-scorer generated a constant bot score of 0, meaning all traffic is bots
From an operations perspective, it would appear they didn't test this on a non-production system mimicing production; they then didn't have a progressive deployment; and they didn't have a circuit breaker to stop the deployment or roll-back when a newly deployed app started crashing.
> The change explained above resulted in all users accessing accurate metadata about tables they have access to. Unfortunately, there were assumptions made in the past, that the list of columns returned by a query like this would only include the “default” database:
SELECT
name,
type
FROM system.columns
WHERE
table = 'http_requests_features'
order by name;
Note how the query does not filter for the database name. With us gradually rolling out the explicit grants to users of a given ClickHouse cluster, after the change at 11:05 the query above started returning “duplicates” of columns because those were for underlying tables stored in the r0 database.And here is the query they used ** (OK, so it's not exactly):
SELECT * from feature JOIN permissions on feature.feature_type_id = permissions.feature_type_id
** "here is the query" is used for dramatic effect. I have no knowledge of what kind of database they are even using much less queries (but i do have an idea).
more edits: OK apparently it's described later in the post as a query against clickhouse's table metadata table, and because users were granted access to an additional database that was actually the backing store to the one they normally worked with, some row level security type of thing doubled up the rows. Not sure why querying system.columns is part of a production level query though, seems overly dynamic.
Any other large-ish company, there would be layers of "stakeholders" that will slow this process down. They will almost always never allow code to be published.
As a visitor to random web pages, I definitely appreciated this—much better than their completely false “checking the security of your connection” message.
> The issue was not caused, directly or indirectly, by a cyber attack or malicious activity of any kind. Instead, it was triggered by a change to one of our database systems' permissions
Also appreciate the honesty here.
> On 18 November 2025 at 11:20 UTC (all times in this blog are UTC), Cloudflare's network began experiencing significant failures to deliver core network traffic. […]
> Core traffic was largely flowing as normal by 14:30. We worked over the next few hours to mitigate increased load on various parts of our network as traffic rushed back online. As of 17:06 all systems at Cloudflare were functioning as normal.
Why did this take so long to resolve? I read through the entire article, and I understand why the outage happened, but when most of the network goes down, why wasn't the first step to revert any recent configuration changes, even ones that seem unrelated to the outage? (Or did I just misread something and this was explained somewhere?)
Of course, the correct solution is always obvious in retrospect, and it's impressive that it only took 7 minutes between the start of the outage and the incident being investigated, but it taking a further 4 hours to resolve the problem and 8 hours total for everything to be back to normal isn't great.
https://how.complexsystems.fail/#18
It'd be fun to read more about how you all procedurally respond to this (but maybe this is just a fixation of mine lately). Like are you tabletopping this scenario, are teams building out runbooks for how to quickly resolve this, what's the balancing test for "this needs a functional change to how our distributed systems work" vs. "instead of layering additional complexity on, we should just have a process for quickly and maybe even speculatively restoring this part of the system to a known good state in an outage".
- A product depends on frequent configuration updates to defend against attackers.
- A bad data file is pushed into production.
- The system is unable to easily/automatically recover from bad data files.
(The CrowdStrike outages were quite a bit worse though, since it took down the entire computer and remediation required manual intervention on thousands of desktops, whereas parts of Cloudflare were still usable throughout the outage and the issue was 100% resolved in a few hours)
Or you do have something like this but the specific db permission change in this context only failed in production
The "...was then propagated to all the machines that make up our network..." followed by "....caused the software to fail." screams for a phased rollout / rollback methodology. I get that "...it’s critical that it is rolled out frequently and rapidly as bad actors change their tactics quickly" but today's outage highlights that rapid deployment isn't all upside.
The remediation section doesn't give me any sense that phased deployment, acceptance testing, and rapid rollback are part of the planned remediation strategy.
Edit: Similar to Crowdstrike, the bot detector should have fallen-back to its last-known-good signature database after panicking, instead of just continuing to panic.
For something so critical, why aren't you using lints to identify and ideally deny panic inducing code. This is one of the biggest strengths of using Rust in the first place for this problem domain.
Wonder why these old grey beards chose to go with that.
Afaik, Go and Java are the only languages that make you pause and explicitly deal with these exceptions.
Surely a unwrap_or_default() would have been a much better fit--if fetching features fails, continue processing with an empty set of rules vs stop world.
This reads to me more like the error type returned by append with names is not (ErrorFlags, i32) and wasn't trivially convertible into that type so someone left an unwrap in place on an "I'll fix it later" basis, but who knows.
I'm pretty surprised that Cloudflare let an unwrap into prod that caused their worst outage in 6 years.
1. https://doc.rust-lang.org/std/option/enum.Option.html#recomm...
I don't know enough about Cloudflare's situation to confidently recommend anything (and I certainly don't know enough to dunk on them, unlike the many Rust experts of this thread) but if I was in their shoes, I'd be a lot less interested in eradicating `unwrap` everywhere and more in making sure than an errant `unwrap` wouldn't produce stable failure modes.
But like, the `unwrap` thing is all programmers here have to latch on to, and there's a psychological self-soothing instinct we all have to seize onto some root cause with a clear fix (or, better yet for dopaminergia, an opportunity to dunk).
A thing I really feel in threads like this is that I'd instinctively have avoided including the detail about an `unwrap` call --- I'd have worded that part more ambiguously --- knowing (because I have a pathological affinity for this community) that this is exactly how HN would react. Maybe ironically, Prince's writing is a little better for not having dodged that bullet.
But I do feel strongly that the expect pattern is a highly useful control and that naked unwraps almost always indicate a failure to reason about the reliability of a change. An unwrap in their core proxy system indicates a problem in their change management process (review, linting, whatever).
> Hardening ingestion of Cloudflare-generated configuration files in the same way we would for user-generated input
> Enabling more global kill switches for features
> Eliminating the ability for core dumps or other error reports to overwhelm system resources
> Reviewing failure modes for error conditions across all core proxy modules
Absent from this list are canary deployments and incremental or wave-based deployment of configuration files (which are often as dangerous as code changes) across fault isolation boundaries -- assuming CloudFlare has such boundaries at all. How are they going to contain the blast radius in the future?
This is something the industry was supposed to learn from the CrowdStrike incident last year, but it's clear that we still have a long way to go.
Also, enabling global anything (i.e., "enabling global kill switches for features") sounds like an incredibly risky idea. One can imagine a bug in a global switch that transforms disabling a feature into disabling an entire system.
I wonder why clickhouse is used to store the feature flags here, as it has it's own duplication footguns[0] which could have also easily lead to a query blowing up 2/3x in size. oltp/sqlite seems more suited, but i'm sure they have their reasons
[0] https://clickhouse.com/docs/guides/developer/deduplication
Also, the link you provided is for eventual deduplication at the storage layer, not deduplication at query time.
People think of configuration updates (or state updates, call them what you will) as inherently safer than code updates, but history (and today!) demonstrates that they are not. Yet even experienced engineers will allow changes like these into production unattended -- even ones who wouldn't dare let a single line of code go live without being subject to the full CI/CD process.
The point here remains: consider every change to involve risk, and architect defensively.
In this case, the older proxy's "fail-closed" categorization of bot activity was obviously better than the "fail-crash", but every global change needs to be carefully validated to have good characteristics here.
Having a mapping of which services are downstream of which other service configs and versions would make detecting global incidents much easier too, by making the causative threads of changes more apparent to the investigators.
Unfortunately they do not share, what caused the status page to went down as well. (Does this happen often? Otherwise a big coincidence it seems)
IDK Atlassian Statuspage clientele, but it's possible Cloudflare is much larger than usual.
At the bare minimum they could've used an expect("this should never happen, if it does database schema is incorrect").
The whole point of errors as values is preventing this kind of thing.... It wouldn't have stopped the outage but it would've made it easy to diagnose.
If anyone at cloudflare is here please let me in that codebase :)
Best post mortem I've read in a while, this thing will be studied for years.
A bit ironic that their internal FL2 tool is supposed to make Cloudflare "faster and more secure" but brought a lot of things down. And yeah, as other have already pointed out, that's a very unsafe use of Rust, should've never made it to production.
I know, this is "Monday morning quarterbacking", but that's what you get for an outage this big that had me tied up for half a day.
It's not necessarily invalid to use unwrap in production code if you would just call panic anyway. But just like every unsafe block needs a SAFETY comment, every unwrap in production code needs an INFALLIBILITY comment. clippy::unwrap_used can enforce this.
Except maybe Haskell.
How many times can you truly prove that an `unwrap()` is correct and that you also need that performance edge?
Ignoring the performance aspect that often comes from a hat-trick, to prove such a thing you need to be wary of the inner workings of a call giving you a `Return`. That knowledge is only valid at the time of writing your `unwrap()`, but won't necessarily hold later.
Also, aren't you implicitly forcing whoever changes the function to check for every smartass dev that decided to `unwrap` at their callsite? That's bonkers.
Having the feature table pivoted (with 200 feature1, feature2, etc columns) meant they had to do meta queries to system.columns to get all the feature columns which made the query sensitive to permissioning changes (especially duplicate databases).
A Crowdstrike style config update that affects all nodes but obviously isn't tested in any QA or staged rollout strategy beforehand (the application panicking straight away with this new file basically proves this).
Finally an error with bot management config files should probably disable bot management vs crash the core proxy.
I'm interested here why they even decided to name Clickhouse as this error could have been caused by any other database. I can see though the replicas updating causing flip / flopping of results would have been really frustrating for incident responders.
The solution to that problem wasn't better testing of database permutations or a better staging environment (though in time we did do those things). It was (1) a watchdog system in our proxies to catch arbitrary deadlocks (which caught other stuff later), (2) segmenting our global broadcast domain for changes into regional broadcast domains so prod rollouts are implicitly staged, and (3) a process for operators to quickly restore that system to a known good state in the early stages of an outage.
(Cloudflare's responses will be different than ours, really I'm just sticking up for the idea that the changes you need don't follow obviously from the immediate facts of an outage.)
I don't use Rust, but a lot of Rust people say if it compiles it runs.
Well Rust won't save you from the usual programming mistake. Not blaming anyone at cloudflare here. I love Cloudflare and the awesome tools they put out.
end of day - let's pick languages | tech because of what we love to do. if you love Rust - pick it all day. I actually wanna try it for industrial robot stuff or small controllers etc.
there's no bad language - just occassional hiccups from us users who use those tools.
could have been tight deadline, managerial pressure or just the occasional slip up.
Unwrapping is a very powerful and important assertion to make in Rust whereby the programmer explicitly states that the value within will not be an error, otherwise panic. This is a contract between the author and the runtime. As you mentioned, this is a human failure, not a language failure.
Pause for a moment and think about what a C++ implementation of a globally distributed network ingress proxy service would look like - and how many memory vulnerabilities there would be… I shudder at the thought… (n.b. nginx)
This is the classic example of when something fails, the failure cause over indexes on - while under indexing on the quadrillions of memory accesses that went off without a single hitch thanks to the borrow checker.
I postulate that whatever the cost in millions or hundreds of millions of dollars by this Cloudflare outage, it has paid for more than by the savings of safe memory access.
This is not a Rust problem. Someone consciously chose to NOT handle an error, possibly thinking "this will never happen". Then someone else conconciouly reviewed (I hope so) a PR with an unwrap() and let it slide.
Disagree. Rust is at least giving you an "are you sure?" moment here. Calling unwrap() should be a red flag, something that a code reviewer asks you to explain; you can have a linter forbid it entirely if you like.
No language will prevent you from writing broken code if you're determined to do so, and no language is impossible to write correct code in if you make a superhuman effort. But most of life happens in the middle, and tools like Rust make a huge difference to how often a small mistake snowballs into a big one.
Do you grok what the issue was with the unwrap, though...?
Idiomatic Rust code does not use that. The fact that it's allowed in a codebase says more about the engineering practices of that particular project/module/whatever. Whoever put the `unwrap` call there had to contend with the notion that it could panic and they still chose to do it.
It's a programmer error, but Rust at least forces you to recognize "okay, I'm going to be an idiot here". There is real value in that.
This is the first significant outage that has involved Rust code, and as you can see the .unwrap is known to carry the risk of a panic and should never be used on production code.
Assuming something similar to Sentry would be in use, it should clearly pick up the many process crashes that start occurring right as the downtime starts. And the well defined clean crashes should in theory also stand out against all the random errors that start occuring all over the system as it begins to go down, precisely because it's always failing at the exact same point.
This simply means, the exception handling quality of your new FL2 is non-existent and is not at par / code logic wise similar to FL.
I hope it was not because of AI driven efficiency gains.
On 18 November 2025 at 11:20 UTC (all times in this blog are UTC), Cloudflare's network began experiencing significant failures
As of 17:06 all systems at Cloudflare were functioning as normal
nawgz•1h ago
> The software had a limit on the size of the feature file that was below its doubled size. That caused the software to fail
A configuration error can cause internet-scale outages. What an era we live in
Edit: also, after finishing my reading, I have to express some surprise that this type of error wasn't caught in a staging environment. If the entire error is that "during migration of ClickHouse nodes, the migration -> query -> configuration file pipeline caused configuration files to become illegally large", it seems intuitive to me that doing this same migration in staging would have identified this exact error, no?
I'm not big on distributed systems by any means, so maybe I'm overly naive, but frankly posting a faulty Rust code snippet that was unwrapping an error value without checking for the error didn't inspire confidence for me!
jmclnx•1h ago
norskeld•59m ago
mewpmewp2•1h ago
I think it's quite rare for any company to have exact similar scale and size of storage in stage as in prod.
Aeolun•56m ago
We’re like a millionth the size of cloudflare and we have automated tests for all (sort of) queries to see what would happen with 20x more data.
Mostly to catch performance regressions, but it would work to catch these issues too.
I guess that doesn’t say anything about how rare it is, because this is also the first company at which I get the time to go to such lengths.
mewpmewp2•51m ago
In this case it seems the database table in question seemed modest in size (the features for ML) so naively thinking they could have kept stage features always in sync with prod at the very least, but could be they didn't consider that 55 rows vs 60 rows or similar could be a breaking point given a certain specific bug.
It is much easier to test with 20x data if you don't have the amount of data cloudflare probably handles.
Aeolun•32m ago
Either way, you don’t need to do it on every commit, just often enough that you catch these kinds of issues before they go to prod.
norskeld•1h ago
Jach•53m ago