[citation needed]

I don’t doubt there was a plan written up, they have plans for all kinds of scenarios. But we have no idea what that plan says. It could well say “avoid doing this if at all possible because of the enormous downsides”. It could also say “the only resolution is a ground invasion that will result in tremendous loss of life”.

The military are not magicians, they cannot make a get out of jail free plan for any given scenario. They can assess positives and negatives and prepare a report for civilian leaders. Who may then ignore it entirely.

Control of the SoH and the BaM requires seizing and holding large areas of inhospitable terrain, with long supply lines and complex human terrain, in contest with an adversary armed with masses of cheap but effective drones. A contested landing to take Bandar Abbas and Qeshm will cost thousands of lives and tens of billions in assets, then you have to hold it for decades while trying to topple a neighbouring regime of religious fanatics.

Tell us more about US minesweepers and the comprehensive United States military planning.

What, no minesweepers in the region? Need help from other allies that have been insulted and told they're not needed for five (non consecutive) years?

Great planning.

Sorry, what's the implication here? That no one else could've considered this all-but-inevitable conflict (inevitable given Republican geopolitical strategy) prior to yesterday? That some people can plan for things but everyone else is a neophyte because of... reasons? I don't understand how something can be "comprehensively planned" in your words, but also no one can possibly have an expertise because the conflict is too new. Which is it?

Military planners foreseeing things doesn't mean much if their commander-in-chief ignores them and substitutes his own uneducated, unplanned feelings for their analysis.

> What's clear is it the way this is being executed is a complete reboot of how prior Middle East conflicts were executed which suggests major ownership of prior problems and learnings applied

The problem is that what they are doing has resulted in failure to keep the strait open. Whether they learned the wrong thing, or applied the wrong lessons, or did not learn anything at all, is an exercise left to the reader.

That's The Guardian for you, sir.

The Chokepoint We Missed: Sulfur, Hormuz, and the Threats to Military Readiness https://mwi.westpoint.edu/the-chokepoint-we-missed-sulfur-ho...

It's reasonable to assume that a fuller version exists in which Morgan D. Bazilian and Macdonald Amoah lay out the background data which Lt. Col. Jahara “Franky” Matisek et al have seen.

  Morgan D. Bazilian is the director of the Payne Institute for Public Policy and professor at the Colorado School of Mines, with over thirty years of experience in global energy policy and investment. A former World Bank lead energy specialist and senior diplomat at the UN, he has held roles in the Irish government and advisory positions with the World Economic Forum and the International Energy Agency. A Fulbright fellow, he has published widely on energy security and international affairs.

  Macdonald Amoah is an independent researcher with interests across critical mineral supply chains, advanced manufacturing gaps, the industrial base, and geopolitical risks in the mining sector.

  Lt. Col. Jahara “Franky” Matisek (PhD) is a US Air Force command pilot, nonresident research fellow at the US Naval War College, and senior fellow at the Payne Institute for Public Policy, and a visiting scholar at Northwestern University. He is the most published active duty officer currently serving, with over 150 articles on industrial base issues, strategy, and warfare.

Until even greater disruption that meaningful takes barrels from PRC to the point of degrading mainland, i.e. after SPR runs dry, PRC suffers significantly less than US while gaining more industrial competitiveness. But, at current level of disruption, i.e. still relatively lack of, PRC wins on essentially every domain.