Zooming way out (perhaps to the point of useless observation), it's a pity that the web embedded VSCode editor is signed into GitHub at all. Defense-in-depth or not, a huge vulnerability surface arises from that original sin. It'd be like if you had a god-permissioned GitHub API token stored in world-readable plaintext on your workstation for the malicious-NPM-package-of-the-week to find.
In a perfect world, it'd be awesome if the in-browser IDE launched with a temporary per-repo permission scope or token that allowed only pull and push to the repo in question; no github.com web session whatsoever. If you want the full GitHub web UI experience, well .... go back to github.com; make github.dev a single-repo service.
I'm assuming that's a) inconvenient for users, b) hard to implement, and c) a historical assumption baked into a lot of the github.dev tooling, though. Ah well.
But then someone else on the team should have to manually approve that MR to allow it to be merged to main.
This kind of defeats the ability of malware to push stuff out automatically.
That's actually exactly what they do for codespaces. The token only has read/write on the repo you activated for the codespace [1]. They should definitely consider doing that for github.dev as well.
[1] https://orca.security/resources/blog/hacking-github-codespac...
Someone is going to be blacklisted by Microsoft.
Classic MSRC. It has figured out that researchers will report for free regardless. Why change?
I'm catching up on the infosec twitter side but it seems like it was even worse. A lot of people have the same story as me in 2023 of "they silently patch the bug and don't even credit you" which really stinks.
I hope you get credit where credit is due in future endeavors.
There are probably better sources but I think this video by The Primeagen is a good introduction.
Noumenon72•52m ago