One thing I appreciate about this kind of research is that it doesn't assume every wireless protocol must end with a catastrophic vulnerability.

A result of "the security is actually pretty good" is arguably just as valuable as finding a critical flaw. It helps distinguish between systems that are merely proprietary and those that were designed with a reasonable threat model in mind.

I'd be interested to know where the remaining weaknesses lie. Are they primarily in the RF protocol itself, key management, device provisioning, or the surrounding cloud infrastructure? In many IoT systems, the radio protocol ends up being the strongest component while the weakest link is somewhere else entirely.

Interesting timing, I have spent the last week with Claude reverse engineering the on-air protocol and I'm getting pretty close to building a secondary "listener" receiver that will collect measurements from my bridge + sensor pair locally.

To Flume's credit, it required me to dump the firmware from the bridge device's ESP8266 in order to extract my key. I didn't consider an approach like this article took, given I have direct access to the HW and there's no flash protection on the 8266.