Imagine if open-source organizations other than the Linux Foundation (and Mozilla I guess) could throw $1.2M of API-rate LLM usage at security.
*buries head in sand*
*cries*
Is the kernel simply too complex to reason about? Is it an underlying flaw in the security model or language implementation?
Should we assume that all software is more compromised than the kernel?
We developed AIs that can find them.
> > We developed AIs that can find them.
We could already find them before AI.
We already knew they were there, and we already knew how to prevent them in the first place.
See previous discussion: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=49705794
But it also got its share of use-after-free and OOB access vulnerabilities this year: https://feedly.com/cve/vendors/openbsd
Is it bulletproof? Definitely! But you need the genius of Albert Einstein as well as the patience of Mother Theresa to actually use it in production.
Absolutely, the front door has always been unlocked. We were previously protected by the economics of exploit detection favoring the developers, but now we have entered a new world.
The issues arise almost everywhere we look. It's frustrating because the user experience in edge systems has barely changed in the last fifteen years. We could have rode the advances in semiconductor manufacturing to embed more layers of protection such as CHERI while slightly slowing down the rate of performance improvements. Instead we have only marginally upgraded security and largely added features which the users scarcely notice.
I am hopeful about the long term prospects of formal verification, but having humans reviewing the proof statements and confirming they match our desired properties will take many years. Meanwhile, AI assisted hacking is an urgent issue. So we will have to delegate implementation, proof specification, and proof development to the AIs in the short term. Maybe that goes well, but who knows. Interesting times.
Now, I don't know how many of those bugs were privilege escalations, or could be leveraged to be. I'm not sure that people tried to exploit in the same way back then (or, if they did, if they said anything publicly about the results). Still, even if the majority of those bugs were not exploitable, OSes were much smaller then.
So that's my conclusion of how we got here: We've always been here.
dangelosaurus•1h ago
And we're hiring! https://openai.com/careers/search/?q=cyber
BoppreH•1h ago
I understand this work was based on a dated snapshot. Will there be any continuous effort, scanning new PRs as they land, to prevent new weaknesses from being added?
ky1ebot1337•30m ago
farisght•49m ago
A system that admits THOUSANDS of such vulnerabilities is certainly flawed in several fundamental aspects
jethro_tell•26m ago
konaraddi•44m ago
E.g., 948 results is a high number to review in a timely manner unless your team is very large or spending several months combing through the results
EDIT: nvm i shouldve kept reading, answered
> At this scale, manually investigating every report is impractical for our research team. We therefore focused on validating findings that a) were reachable by a low-privileged user, b) required no special capabilities, and c) produced measurable evidence of memory corruption.
ahsillyme•18m ago
basilikum•5m ago