In practice there aren't legal repercussions. If you import scheduled drugs (adderall, opioids, etc.) and get caught that's obviously going to be a big issue. But with most prescription medications, the worst case scenario is that Customs will just toss your package. And the likelihood of that is low; the majority of the time it makes it through undetected.
I've done this in the past with another drug. In the US it was $30/month but from India I got 1000 pills for $30 + $40 expedited shipping. For me the big factor wasn't cost, but rather the convenience of not needing to go through the process of getting a prescription.
https://www.flgov.com/eog/news/press/2024/florida-becomes-fi...
> "Today, the DeSantis administration received U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approval of its Canadian Prescription Drug Importation Program. The Agency for Health Care Administration (AHCA) submitted this first-of-its-kind plan to safely import cheaper drugs from Canada to the FDA nearly 37 months ago, and after filing a lawsuit against the FDA due to delays, has finally received approval. This approval will save Florida up to $180 million in the first year."
Thanks to the bargaining power of my nationalised healthcare, my government pays around 1/5th of that, and I'll pay nothing myself.
Revlamid is listed under it's generic name Lenalidomide, price is in pence: https://www.drugtariff.nhsbsa.nhs.uk/#/00791628-DD/DD0079145...
I'm trying to remember who it was who said you could sum all of economics up with the sentence "people respond to incentives."
> Which is why there should be no patents in healthcare. Most research is already publicly-funded, production and distribution should be too. We could drown in cheap medicine, instead we artificially increase the prices by 5000% to fatten the pockets of already super-wealthy parasites.
If a company sells a pill for $100 that cost them $2 to manufacture, that's a 5000% markup. Indeed, they would need to recoup R&D expenditures, but I am arguing for a system where we don't need to, because R&D is paid for by the state, and we don't need to turn a profit once the product has been developed. Where's the logic flaw?
Europeans get some drugs for 50x cheaper than Americans because of collective bargaining. Isn't that definite proof there is unnecessary profiteering in the final price?
Have you ever wondered why this is the case?
In the "Golden Age" of pharmaceutical development -- from roughly 1930 through 1962 -- it cost orders of magnitude less, adjusted for inflation, was much faster, and outcomes were no worse.
I'd argue that the new (post-1962) Phases II and III -- drug efficacy studies -- are wholly unnecessary and are indeed unethical.
First, because you can't even presume to gauge a drug's "efficacy" without huge and exorbitantly expensive trials -- and, even then, trials can be inconclusive.
Second, because the FDA selectively ignores efficacy data. See, e.g,. flibanserin and certain Alzheimer's drugs that have been approved recently. This was scandalous, but not nearly scandalous enough.
Third, the statistically sound way to find both rare harms and true-to-life benefits is to watch how a drug behaves in millions of real patients, not in a few thousand volunteers. Modern electronic-health-record feeds, claims databases, and wearable data streams let regulators run near-real-time Bayesian safety signals across populations that dwarf any Phase III cohort; the surveillance network that caught rofecoxib’s cardiovascular signal in 2004 had orders-of-magnitude more patient exposure than the approving trials, and today’s infrastructure is far denser.
It would literally be 10x faster, 100x cheaper, and 100x easier to grant conditional approval after Phase I and then run postmarketing surveillance. You'd better signal-to-noise on both efficacy and harm at a small fraction of the cost and time. It's downright perverse to outlaw early access to promising investigational drugs, forcing patients to wait 8-12 years, and then foot them with a multibillion-dollar bill for ritualized trials that are unnecessary -- for the same ends could have been attained in far better ways.
However, I would raise two objections.
1. Without a Phase III trial that proves effectiveness, payers do not have sufficient motivation to purchase a drug that may or may not work. One solution would be to have the producer of the drug offer the drug for free/cheap until it demonstrates effectiveness, but that becomes a lot more expensive when you have a larger cohort. This is admittedly an implementation detail that could be sorted out, but it's a very important detail that would have to be addressed for this plan to work in the real world. The bigger problem is:
2. The best way to prove that a drug works is a large, randomized controlled trial. Your proposal is definitely an improvement over current trials in terms of making them larger, which would help to improve statistical power (and also get potentially helpful drugs into the hands of patients, of course). However, without the "ritual" of a Phase III trial, you lose randomization and you lose the placebo control. These are big losses that make statistical interpretation of results very hard because they open up the door to many potential confounders. As you mentioned, Bayesian signals can try to control for some of these confounders, but you can never be confident that you've considered every possible variable, whereas randomized placebos can eliminate almost all confounders.
So ultimately, I think that Phase III effectiveness trials are necessary in order to prove effectiveness because the statistics with post-market Phase IV trials will never be as "clean" as an RCT. And if we were to delete Phase III trials and skip straight to Phase IV, we would never again be able to confidently say whether or not a drug works. Thus, the ethical cost of making patients wait a few years for the Phase III trials to finish is outweighed by the benefit of being able to say with confidence that the drug works for the rest of eternity.
And, besides, I think it stands to reason that if time-to-market and drug development costs are reduced, prices will inevitably drop, and there'll be more competition in the market.
Right now, small firms are effectively priced out of the pharmaceutical market. The typical business model is to develop something to preclinical/Phase I and pray for a buyer or "partner" -- a larger firm that specializes in regulatory compliance and has pockets deep enough for continued development.
As for #2:
What makes you think you need a placebo control? And have you considered that in certain otherwise-fatal diseases, a placebo control might be grossly unethical in and of itself?
There's no way to eliminate confounders, anyway. Even in clinical trials, patients aren't kept in bubbles. (Some of them might even drink grapefruit juice!)
The problem with "proving effectiveness" is that it's inordinately difficult (sometimes actually impossible) and the costs are borne by patients and society. "Golden Age" drugs like penicillin and corticosteroids, among many others, didn't need efficacy trials. Drugs don't really need them today. With enough data derived from patient populations, we can do much better -- faster, too, and more ethically.
Generally I think (this is highly subjective and irrational, of course) that I'd be comfortable with a 10%-20% return-on-capital overall. Lower than that and I'd think that risky drugs couldn't get funding; higher and I'd think there's too much rent-seeking.
Perhaps some economists have studied what an optimal ROC might be for pharmaceuticals.
In any case, the gross margin per-pill doesn't really tell you anything about ROC. 99.875% is astounding, but what was invested to get to that point - including the drugs that never made it to market?
These guys are making 300% ROI in annual revenue from their one-time investment into R&D. In order for that to be fair (in line with your 20% average ROI target), they would need to be testing 15 new drugs per year, and if all of the others had failed, then it would be fair to markup the one that succeeded by this amount. But according to the Wikipedia page, the company has investigated less than 10 drugs in their entire existence, much less 15 drugs per year.
It works so well that their efficacy reports have caveats like “not enough patients that were treated have died yet” to provide meaningful statistics.
The drug was initially developed in china. They presented results at a conference in the USA but no one believed them other than a skeptical Pfizer who sent a big team to china to confirm the data. Pfizer soon invested billions into the company and drug to bring it to market.
The drug’s sales are on track to be $1 billion this year but the stock is heavily depressed because of the china connection.
Selling $1B of drugs might no necessarily mean they have sufficient free cash flow to do the things they want to do.
That daily pill is 25mg. You can buy 5g of Revlimid's active ingredient for $352.
> https://www.sigmaaldrich.com/US/en/product/aldrich/901558
200 doses at less than $2/ea.
If you want to get adventurous, you can probably buy 1kg from China or India for $900. Find a university or commercial lab with HPLC and LC/MS and run your own QC for a few hundred bucks. Store the powder in a vacuum-sealed container in a refrigerator. You're set for life.
I've done this sort of thing before, and a lot of people are doing it for GLP agonist drugs. (To say nothing of sports doping, nootropics, etc.)
Sometimes you've gotta take matters into your own hands.
https://web.archive.org/web/20220811173542/https://ir.celgen...
> Celgene has agreed to provide Alvogen with a license to Celgene’s patents required to manufacture and sell an unlimited quantity of generic lenalidomide in the United States beginning no earlier than January 31, 2026.
planck_tonne•9mo ago
How did they do that?
Why is the sale of a super expensive drug used exclusively to treat a super specific type of cancer even controlled in the first place? What is even the argument?
I couldn't think of any argument before. After reading, I can only think of "to restrict competition".
throwanem•9mo ago
Look, I didn't say I buy it. But you asked for the basic argument advocates make in support of such practices, and here it is.
throwawaymaths•9mo ago
smt88•9mo ago
nradov•9mo ago
throwanem•9mo ago
It is as if VCs in the tech industry demanded the taxpayer guarantee them a healthy rate of profit, to a standard of health the VCs themselves are privileged to define. Indeed, as with Allred and the regional airlines, perhaps now we see whence Altman has cribbed his "innovation."
nradov•9mo ago
One could make an argument that taxpayer subsidized health plans which include prescription drug coverage such as Medicare Part D or Medicaid should limit the prices they are willing to reimburse on a QALY basis. And Medicare has started a limited drug price negotiation program. But generally, voters have been unwilling to accept the trade-offs inherent in drug price controls.
https://www.cms.gov/newsroom/fact-sheets/medicare-drug-price...
throwanem•9mo ago
(If you want to do something else, I can't tell what it would be.)
nradov•9mo ago
mikeyouse•9mo ago
nradov•9mo ago
https://www.fiercebiotech.com/biotech/drug-development-cost-...
throwawaymaths•9mo ago
cogman10•9mo ago
Big pharma is providing very little benefit and a lot of cost. We've seen their playbook with people like Martin Shkreli who'll buy up patents to existing drugs and jack up the price to make a quick buck. Do we really need that sort of "private investment"?
nradov•9mo ago
The primary claim in support of the current system is that it encourages greater levels of innovation than would happen under a socialized central planning system where government bureaucrats allocate funding for all trials. We don't have any solid evidence about that one way or the other. But year after year, US pharma companies do consistently release more new drugs than any other countries on a per-capita basis. We don't want to wreck that just because of high prices on a few patent protected drugs. Let's take a longer view and consider possible second-order effects before making any drastic changes.
cogman10•9mo ago
What innovation? All the innovation with the current system happens outside the big pharma companies. They are merely swooping in at the final steps and manufacturing to benefit from the public investment.
The actual innovation is happening because of public social investment. Not because if private investment (at least in terms of medicine). Private investment here is simply leaching off of the public investment.
nradov•9mo ago
If we want to have new a lot of new drugs every year that meet the FDA standard for being safe and effective then someone has to put in enormous capital investments. In theory I suppose we could raise taxes and socialize the whole system but so far I haven't seen any evidence that would be a net improvement. More likely just another opportunity for graft and corruption.
cogman10•9mo ago
90% of the system is socialized. The remaining 10% is what pharma funds.
> I suppose we could raise taxes and socialize the whole system but so far I haven't seen any evidence that would be a net improvement.
The entire process is already experiencing the worst parts of what being fully socialized would bring. Everyone is paying for health insurance whose rates are partially set by the cost of the drugs to the general public. We also already pay taxes to develop these drugs via the NIH. Heck, part our taxes pay to manufacture these drugs via the DoD and the VA.
The main benefit of fully socializing these drugs is that it will be cheaper for everyone and we can bring more drugs to market. We don't have to pay advertising, executives, or shareholders for new drugs. We don't have to worry about these new drugs turning a profit.
The graft and corrupting in government is nearly entirely in the form of private contractors working for the government. It's how the current system works where the public funds a huge portion of the research while a few large companies rake in exhobitant fees.
And even worse, we have examples of vioxx, Dalton, and oxy where these companies knowingly push unsafe medicine to turn a profit. That simply doesn't happen with a fully social system as there's literally no benefit to anyone to keeping unsafe drugs around.
smt88•9mo ago
An ideal metric would be "person-years of increased healthspan per dollar spent by the consumer," and I'd wager that's very low because the profit motive is to create drugs that treat symptoms (and are prescribed for life) rather than cure an illness.
cogman10•9mo ago
Curing cancers also will remain a particularly lucrative trade. Particularly because cancer is a million different diseases which everyone gets if they live long enough.
There is never just one person that gets a disease.
That said, it's definitely true that pharma will never spend research dollars to see if a disease can be treated with a generic drug. Universities and the NIH can and do.
throwanem•9mo ago
cogman10•9mo ago
Prediabetes and hypertension. Assuming long term dietary changes, outside of treatment those effects are pretty permanent.
> What outside the treatment period does it prevent?
Again, assuming dietary changes, it'll prevent type 2 diabetes and heart attacks.
throwanem•9mo ago
nradov•9mo ago
https://www.virtahealth.com/research
throwanem•9mo ago
My point in any case is precisely as you note: People rarely stick to diets. Semaglutide for obesity therefore presumptively is a maintenance medication. That is, if I diet and take semaglutide and lose fifty pounds, and then cease both treatments, I will almost certainly gain back fifty-plus pounds. But - as I understand it, at least - if I only take semaglutide and make no effort at dietary regulation, I will still lose weight, because the medication limits hunger and increases satiation: even with an entirely slovenly eating habit, I won't do myself the damage I would otherwise, but only so long as I remain on the medication. If I stop, I'll minimally gain back weight and likely rebound in the manner of a yo-yo dieter. I have not been "cured." And it is the novel obesity application, not the longstanding diabetes indications, which is the breakout moneymaker. (I said I wouldn't cavil about that, not that it didn't bear talking about.)
I concede I might have a different view of the matter if I had a weight problem, but it is not actually complicated to diet off fifty or sixty pounds to a healthy weight and body composition, and then stay that way. It's only difficult, in that it requires more or less reorganizing one's entire life for years, to support the firm entrenchment of new and healthier habits. That's obviously not something everyone can do. For those unable, I'm glad options like semaglutide also exist. I just don't see any reason to dissemble over what they can actually do and what they cannot.
nradov•9mo ago
throwanem•8mo ago
cogman10•9mo ago
That indicates to me it's doing a bit more than just appetite suppression.
throwanem•9mo ago
I don't know if that matters, or how much, for the obesity application, where appetite suppression seems plausibly the effect of sole or major interest.
s1artibartfast•9mo ago
Cures are hard. No companies are suppressing cures that would make them tens of billions of dollars out of long term self interest. You take the cash and move on to the next one (or not).
The time value of money means that profits more than 10 years or so into the future are essentially irrelevant compared to money today.
SAI_Peregrinus•9mo ago
throwawaymaths•9mo ago
tough•9mo ago
America, the land of the dollar
ricksunny•9mo ago
Correction: America, the land of the rent-seeking.
bschne•9mo ago
Roche (Pharma Division): 7533 MCHF vs. 11096 MCHF
Novartis: 12566 MUSD vs. 10022 MUSD
Pfizer: 14730 MUSD vs. 10822 MUSD
Eli Lilly: 8594 MUSD vs. 10991 MUSD
AstraZeneca: 19977 MUSD vs. 13583 MUSD
Johnson & Johnson: 22869 MUSD vs. 17232 MUSD
The left side here contains more than just marketing, and already "far far outstripping" seems like a mischaracterization.
For comparison, the average R&D spend between these firms is bigger than the 2024 NSF budget (~9bn) and bigger than 1/4 of the 2024 NIH budget (~37bn).
dgacmu•9mo ago
bschne•9mo ago
derektank•9mo ago
tptacek•9mo ago
(I don't know how much that matters in this case, where a tiny company lucked into a blockbuster and then used every lever in the system to protect their exclusivity).
throwanem•9mo ago
tptacek•9mo ago
(Pharmaceutical costs, all in, across the board, are a relatively small component of total health spending in the US. They're not why your health insurance is so expensive.)
This is mostly a story about anticompetitive abuses, so that question isn't super relevant to the story. I'm just answering the claim that invisible marketing/SG&A costs are why drugs cost so much. They also cost a lot because most drugs fail, sometimes after billions invested.
throwawaymaths•9mo ago
throwanem•9mo ago
leereeves•9mo ago
How does that work? Does it extend patent protection on the original molecule? Or if not, what stops generic copies of the original version?
throwanem•9mo ago
s1artibartfast•9mo ago
What is does is stagger coverage with version release so that you have coverage for latest and greatest version.
Generics are extremely common following patent exclusivity. By then, patients and doctors usually want the shiny new drug.
jmward01•9mo ago
photochemsyn•9mo ago
> "Celgene had acquired the rights to thalidomide patents held by researchers at Rockefeller University in 1992."
Change Bayh-Dole law to non-exclusive licensing, but with some level of royalties paid to institution that originated the patent, and other corporations could have made the drug - and it would be a competitive market, so costs would drop due to lack of a monopoly on the drug.
This one simple change to Bayh-Dole - 'non-exclusive' - would upset the academic-corporate apple cart well beyond pharmaceuticals. Eg the PageRank algorithm created at Stanford could not have been exclusive licensed to Google - any American corporation or person could have applied for a license to the invention, entirely erasing the benefits of a monopolistic patent to the corporation.
One great benefit of this change is that corporations who wanted exclusive patents would have to finance their own private R & D divisions, instead of just capturing the output of taxpayer-financed researchers.