I think that it might more have legal implications than practical ones. It wont protect the organization from information exfiltration, but it might legally protect it, in the sense that a court might state that the necessary technical measures were there, so the organization is not responsible for the data leak that happened... or something in that direction.

I had aggressively disgruntled colleagues that couldn‘t deal with being fired, having 3 month notice period and 2 extra salaries and called the CEO names via anonymous all hands meeting.

Many people are babies.

> I don’t know about you but sometimes it’s some small piece of information that isn’t worth contacting the presenter about. I need to call or craft an email, be polite and come up with some nonsense greeting maybe for a bullet point or two or a string I don’t want to rapidly shift focus to duplicate by hand. Then I have to sit around and wait for a response where they have to do the same, and I’m definitely not their priority.

So it’s something critically important for you to get your job done, but also something that’s not worth writing a couple sentence e-mail about, but also going to block your work while you sit around and wait all day for it?

Communication is the foundation of any office job. If you’re in a meeting with these people, just ask in the meeting? If you can’t, send an email during the meeting and you haven’t lost any time. It’s really not as hard as you’re trying to make it sound.

I generally discourage people from using ChatGPT for office communication, but to be honest if writing a simple e-mail request to get something you need for your job triggers this level of overthinking, you might benefit from letting it at least draft the email to get you started and past the analysis paralysis.

This is highlighted by how many different types of user interface environments are implemented in free s/w platforms, vs the monoculture user interfaces of proprietary OSes.

The resultant windoze brain damage is a co-mingling of "you don't know what you don't know", lack of awareness of just how varied computer interfaces could be, with the "child indoctrination" aspect that nothing else seems quite right when it's not what you were raised on.

After my first programming experiences, on a TRS-80 in the mall radio shack in the late '70s, I was exposed to a variety of user interfaces, but eventually became locked into windows myself, mostly from employer enforcement.

The thing that drove me away in the end was the way various settings were moved around with each new release, and the way my workflow had to constantly adapt to arbitrary changes in the user interface with each revision.

After exploring a wide variety of desktop environments, I've been on fluxbox window manager for many years now and I'm still quite satisfied. All of my configuration options are in my home directory, and my user interface experience is recreated without incident when updating, and even when moving to new h/w.

But the monoculture is wide spread, and continues to inhibit computer innovation outside of what will benefit the mothership...

Plenty of people would pay to watch a camcorder copy of a new release film rather than pay the cost of taking the whole family to the theatre. That’s why it was commonly done. Now you just go online.

Yup: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Consumer_Broadband_and_Digital.... Scarily it would be more technically feasible to implement this today than it was then.

Most cheap HDMI splitters seem to disable HDCP.

Really? I didn't know it was possible to use DRM like WideVine for peer-to-peer video.

> Some people might want it, but it doesn’t actually work

Why do you think they can't prevent on-device screenshots/screen recording can't be prevented when you control the entire stack?

Yeah, some enterprise admin will click it and make it clickable for others. It’s a classic ratchet of enshittification until things reach a magic intolerability point and folks evacuate to other systems leading those to get rolled into one of the borgs: lather, rinse, repeat.

Why is everyone so shy to say: some people are really fucking stupid, especially at executives at giant companies.

It doesn't work against which threat model?

Yeah, if you've got corporate espionage going on this isn't going to stop someone from lifting your slides and taking them elsewhere. But the most common culprit of corporate information security violations isn't a spy, it's a well-meaning employee who didn't hear, remember, or correctly interpret the request to not record the meeting.

Blocking the most common way in which this kind of well-meaning but ill-informed employee would break the expected security rules does work. It's just getting flak here because people are imagining a much more exciting threat model.

You don’t get invited to the right meetings, I see.

> There isn’t a single user (presenter) that would ask something like this.

Asking participants not to screen record or take screenshot was standard practice at every company I’ve worked at where we discussed anything like financials or sensitive business plans.

Pretty common where I have worked. Most commonly when reviewing internal product roadmaps to our sales teams because we've burned too many times when customers complain that we haven't implemented something we never announced but a sales person mentioned/showed.

> The fact that with a simple mobile having a camera you can copy whatever is being presented (or with slightly more technical ways) is irrelevant for laws and procedures ;-)

That you think the only attack vector here is a 3rd party device means you haven't really considered everything. Consider screenshots that might happen for many reasons, including malicious software, or even normal software someone might be using, and accidental exposure.

If you have a camera on a stand or are holding up a phone, other participants will able to see it and object. Of course it's still possible to get around it. It's possible to get around anything. The idea of privacy controls is to make bad-faith jerks have to work significantly harder.

In a 1:1 format this would be effective in preventing some forms of misuse because it would be obvious if an individual took out their phone and pointed it towards the screen.

It's not pure security theater, there are a few clear gains for those who care about such things:

* Naive screencaps are much less traceable to the leaker than a naive photo is. Yes, someone can strip out EXIF data, but we've seen over and over again that they generally don't. And even without EXIF a naive framing on the photo is more likely to expose information about the location or identity of the person who took it.

* A photo of a webinar is going to (barring serious postprocessing) look much less official and be less legible than a screenshot, so the use cases for illicit captures are going to be fewer. Few people are going to try to take a phone photo of the top-secret meeting and use the slide in their next team all-hands, but many might forget the rules and than snap a screenshot really quickly for later use.

* Just having the ability to block the easy method of screen captures helps avoid cases where the person doing the capturing isn't actively malicious, just ill-informed. If a normal employee attempts a screenshot and is reminded they're not supposed to do that, they're not going to pull out their phone to take a photo, they're going to say "oops" and move on.

Yeah, there are threat models that won't be stopped here, but most of corporate InfoSec is wrapped up in protecting against pretty lame threat models that would benefit from this—mostly uninformed/ignorant employees screwing up without intending to be a threat.

I’ve been on calls where a presenter explicitly asks that people not screenshot slides shown in the meeting because they’re drafts that will be refined and published or circulated later on. Some companies probably have that as a blanket policy. I’m sure this isn’t universally followed.

This feature would help make that less likely to happen accidentally or “accidentally.” It wouldn’t stop deliberate leaks but that’s a different problem.

That’s because what the users want isn’t actually being secure. They want to be able to say they did everything in their power to stop people from capturing sensitive info.

It’s all about diffusing that responsibility.

Nah, this would stop a lot of threats.

I'm an example of that threat. I'm a freelancer who often has video calls with new clients. Sometimes I surreptitiously screen cap demos or presentations. It would be very difficult to use a phone that way without breaking the conversational flow.

Other supposed workarounds would require much more preplanning. Like I'd need to know that there was something worth capturing.