Why not just use different passwords for different things. I'd recommend something like privacy.com so you can generate a bunch of one-use cc cards when doing shopping on sites you don't trust and the like.
Also don't willingly give up valuable personal information unless it's absolutely necessary, it's also not illegal to give online services outright false information (incorrect birthdates for example) which, in the event of a future data breach of that service, now at least those who would plan to benefit from your personal information might have some difficulties resetting important accs and the like.
You just gotta be smart, it's not about being powerless, HIBP and the service is just one tool to make you aware of what's out there before it gets used against you. (I would highly recommend setting up notifications for important e-mail addresses)
My card has been skimmed a couple of times and by far the most annoying part of the experience is having to reset and update regular accounts with the new number.
Of course for online purchases the whole flow here should be inverted: businesses should just be registering against my payment provider directly, no account numbers involved (under the hood maybe have it be managed by ED25519 public keys for identity?)
EDIT: while we're at it, why even have persistent numbers for in person cards? Let me tap it against my phone, invalidate the stored key from that time on, and generate a new one.
My latest card (debit) one has a feature I've not seen elsewhere, but I think kind of solves that too. It has a new CVC number every 10 minutes, which I kind of both hate and love. Love it for the obvious reasons of "not even having the physical card lets you use it digitally" but also because I cannot have it 100% in my password manager, I have to use the banking app to get the latest CVC code when I need it.
Plus then my gibberish name on my card number will match the gibberish secret question answers.
Uncaught (in promise) Error: Invalid response from fetch: 401 -
at emailSearch.ts:295:19
at async HTMLButtonElement.<anonymous> (emailSearch.ts:43:23)Maybe I'm reading it wrong but it looks like it might be a little off. I get:
- October 2013
- June 2008
- ...a bunch more...
- November 2021
- December 2020
I've been added to door/visitor notifications. I have received medical information for them. Retirement package info. A telecom internal tracker. A Doubleclick account for a while. Lessons for their children. Countless rewards accounts.
Most probably some ancient legacy mainframe or whatnot other integration that nobody really has the time and budget to clean up and migrate to something more modern.
The larger the company, the larger the risk for ossification of anything deemed "business critical" because even a minuscule outage of one hour now is six if not seven figures worth of "lost" time.
It’s really just been a similar problem as with AI code, that without strong and competent management that can set intelligent expectations and requirements and test for them, you will surely get what appears to all the business and leadership types like an equivalent product, without any sense that it’s slop underneath the surface.
You may have some kind of logging / tracking / analytics somewhere that logs request bodies. You don't even have to engage in marketing shenanigans for that to be a problem, an abuse prevention system (which is definitely a necessity at their scale) is enough.
Storing unsalted passwords in the "passwords database" is uncommon. Storing request logs from e.g. the Android app's API gateway, and forgetting to mark the `password` field in the forgot password flow as sensitive? Not so uncommon.
Yes, it's easy to fuck up. But a responsible company implements mitigations. And LinkedIn can absolutely afford to do much more.
It does have some challenges in introducing a read-before-write to fetch the session key at the start of the session, but given the relatively low call volume of such flows that might be a small price to pay to simplify security audits and de-risk changes to any service in the call chain.
So yeah, LinkedIn have never been exactly a bastion of IT Security.
I do find the timeline to be a little confusing- it seems to be ordered from earliest breach to most recent, but the dates on the timeline don't match that, as they seem to be when the data was leaked?
Display: breach date Ordering: breach published date?
I think it might be clearer to order + display the published date, and in the cards themselves show the breach date in a standard way.
Small bug report: I've been pwnd a few dozens times, and my timeline is not in calendar order. I see Adobe (October 2013), then LinkedIn (May 2012), then Dropbox (June 2012), then Lastfm (March 2012), then some 2016 ones, then Kickstarter in 2014, and then after that they start being more in order of the listed dates.
Tie in to a banking service, so you can do direct deposits to many millions of people, every time there's new settlements paid, and you'll be a folk hero.
Get lawyers who want negligent companies to actually regret the breaches, with judgements that hurt. (Rather than a small settlement that gets lawyers paid, but is only a small cost of doing business, which is preferable to doing business responsibly.)
Optional: Sell data of imminent lawsuits, to an investment firm.
Though, ideally, investors won't need this data, since everyone will know that a breach means a stock should take a hit. Isn't that how it should be.
I wish I could easily donate my tiny settlements to a good cause. It might make it worth the time to register for the class.
Isn't this just regulation?
1. How else would you penalize businesses?
2. What else would you do with fines?
If fines exist, it would seem foolish not to budget around that.
So that means that any kind of system that would improve traffic other than repressive measures would cost them twice, once to fix the situation and again when they can issue less fines.
I just want to say that in modern times safety is put as #1 priority, while it's actually always a balance. E.g. we wanted the safest airline industry, we'd close the airports. But we balance the safety vs usefulness.
I don't think that's a logically self-consistent idea. The "actual occurrence of the offense" is not an inevitable pre-existing fact, it exists downstream of the size of the fine and efficiency of enforcement. If you fine people 5% of their annual income for going 1 mph over the speed limit, and put more traffic enforcement on the road, fewer people are going to speed.
So to answer the question "what's the ideal collection amount", you have to consider what the costs (economic and social) of rule breaking behavior are, and trade those off with how much behavior can be modified by fines, as well as the costs of enforcement.
Furthermore, just taking the statement at face value, the only way to actually collect the size of the fine multiplied by the actual occurrence of the offense is to successfully fine 100% of offenders or fine some non-offenders, but even if this is possible it's almost certainly not the "ideal" amount of enforcement.
That says a whole lot all by itself. You acknowledge that reform doesn’t work? There is always money to be made because people don’t like the set of rules set? So when people follow all those rules, make new rules that people will break to keep it going? Where does it stop?
Maybe this time we can come up with a better way to disincentivize corruption and bribery.
Getting a company to publicly announce a breach is hard today. Your suggestion would make it even harder, and more data breaches would be kept from the public because of the consequences.
I would rather know that a company messed up and change my password, than not knowing
How? Disclosure should already be legally required--class-actions and lawsuits should already be a thing. The Have I Been Pwned data sets aren't volunteered by these companies. It's a catalog of leaked data.
The class-action response of "identity monitoring" is nonsense. More companies, if they can't afford to or don't want secure data, shouldn't collect it or should aggressively purge it. User data should be a liability.
and how long until that data is breached?
I bet companies even buyback after these dips.
He is a Microsoft employee.
https://www.troyhunt.com/about/ says "I don't work for Microsoft"
We can debate semantics but if you describe yourself with a job title attached to a company then I suggest that you have an association which looks rather like ... employment.
Extending your logic, I have a CCIE, so if I ever state I'm a CCIE, I'm an employee of Cisco? I have a masters degree by coursework from a university, so I I ever state I have an Msc, I'm an employee of the university? I have an electrical licences issued by EnergySafe Victoria, so if I say I'm an A-Grade Electrician, I'm an employee of EnergySafe Victoria?
Can we make it so that companies I've never heard of before don't have my data in the first place?
john@hotmail.com has 340!
For anyone considering, here are the 3 opt-outions that appear after you email verify:
1. Just remove my email address from public search
No one using the public HIBP search feature will be able to see your email address in the results. You’ll still be able to search your own address through the notification service, which verifies that you control the email before showing any results. If your email is part of a domain monitored by someone else (e.g., your employer), the domain controller will still be able to see it in domain-level searches.
2. Remove my email address from public search and delete the list of breaches it appears in
Your email address is no longer searchable — neither through the public service nor by you, even if you verify ownership — because the associated breaches have been deleted from the database. However, your email address is still retained by HIBP to ensure it is excluded from any future breaches and not added to your record.
3. Delete my email address completely
The record containing your email address will be completely deleted, meaning it will no longer appear in search results — for you or the public — at the time of deletion. However, if your email address appears in future data breaches, it will become publicly searchable again, as the opt-out record itself has also been deleted.
I'd make the language around that promo banner stronger (ie. "We strongly recommend") and make it stand out more on the page.
So many social media accounts get hacked[0] because of shared passwords and those affected users often end up on the site - funnelling them to a password manager and a reason why it's good hygiene is great.
ps. congrats on the relaunch!
[0] I've probably assisted 20+ such cases in the past ~12 months
Obtaining and storing TBs of leaked databases is another part of the puzzle that is always growing and a bit more complex.
Will Cloudflare sell data to US TLA agencies? Probably.
I'm not sure I really need it for personal use, more just a cool thing to see, so I'm a bit undecided on paying for the domain feature. I can see it being useful for a business though where each email is a different employee dealing with accounts everywhere.
If they have other PII of yours, it's a heads up that scammers might target you and/or your family with that information.
For work use: To monitor which sites/services employees use with work email addresses, and use it as a reminder/re-enforcement that they should rotate credentials used on that service, and if they're reusing them at work - to change there, too.
- Apple: me.apple@example.com - Google: me.google@example.com - Uber: me.uber@example.com - Tinder: me.tinder@example.com - random business: me.randombusinessname@example.com
This helps me with the following:
- unique usernames and passwords for each service
- easily able to tell when a service sells my information or gets hacked/breached
- "haveibeenpwned" also allows mail server owners to get access to reports for all addresses on a domain and receive notifications on breaches
- much easier to remember and communicate with others as compared to iCloud hide my e-mail addresses
- on the outgoing/sending, re-writing the "from" address field in e-mails is very easy to do
mNovak•5h ago
aetherspawn•5h ago
MarcelOlsz•5h ago
burgerrito•5h ago
rainonmoon•1h ago
kevinsundar•5h ago
https://medium.com/design-bootcamp/the-rise-of-linear-style-...
SchemaLoad•4h ago
Brajeshwar•1h ago
A similar design wave is also happening with internal dashboard, admin interfaces. Thanks to https://ui.shadcn.com Personally, I'm fine with the standardization of such functional interface designs.
btw, for Have I Been Pwned, this is Bootstrap[2] and I'm not surprised it is also inheriting those design styles.
1. https://tailwindcss.com/plus
2. https://getbootstrap.com