Most of corporate security nowadays involves "endpoint security solutions" installed on all devices, servers and VMs, piping everything into an AI-powered dashboard so we can move fast and break everything.

I audited Trivy's GitHub Actions a while back and found some worrying things, the most worrying bit was in the setup-trivy Action where it was doing a clone of main of the trivy repo and executing a shell script in there. There was no ref pinning until somebody raised a PR a few months ago. So a security company gave themselves arbitrary code execution in everyone's CI workflows.

Aqua were breached earlier this month, failed to contain it, got breached again last week, failed to contain it again, and now the attackers have breached their Docker Hub account. Shit happens but they're clearly not capable of handling this and should be enlisting outside help.

Granting broad access to "security" tools so some vendor can take another shot at your prod keys is not risk reduction. Most of these things are just report printers that makes more noise than a legacy SIEM, and once an attacker is inside they don't do much besides dump findings into a dashboard nobody will read.

If you want less self-inflicted damage, stick new scanners in a tight sandbox, feed them read-only miror data, and keep them away from prod perms until they have earned trust with a boring review of exactly what they touch and where the data goes. Otherwise you may as well wire your secrets to a public pastebin and call it testing.

What if we just rebuild everything from scratch with AI? No more supply chain attacks!

Don't underestimate the prowess of Microslop to fuck up. I'm just glad I saw all of this coming and abandoned this hellscape long ago.

No, the actor reappeared. This article is not fully updated. On March 22nd, the actor compromised their DockerHub account and published new Docker images.

I don't think it would help here, they were stealing credentials

The sandbox will need internet access (to update data) and you will need to send code to test into it; so compromise already equals leaking all your code, without even breaking the sandboxing