It's clear that the perceived curve will be differently sloped, as no one will evaluate themselves as the topmost or the bottommost percentiles, so the edges will be biased.
And if in both cases we draw differences between perceived and actual, we will get the same curve that everyone knows, biased or not.
In the old plot, the bottom quartile has about a 50 percentage point margin between actual and perceived performance while the new one is 30 percentage points, which is a 50% difference between the old and new curve. The second quartile has 3x more margin in the old version relative to the new one.
Source code is here: https://github.com/pem725/Dunning-Kruger (found here: https://pem725.github.io)
Mentioning the Dunning-Krueger effect incorrectly is wonderfully meta...
Software engineers tend to repeat the mantra "you cannot make accurate time estimates". That is true regardless of experience level, and everyone seems to be off by about the same amount. So there we have evidence that people overestimate their skills at every level, and its not that different.
Self-deception by any other name is still self-deception.
The Dunning-Kruger effect also applies to smart people. You don't stop when you are estimating your ability correctly. As you learn more, you gain more awareness of your ignorance and continue being conservative with your self-estimates.
But overall I think real intelligence by definition requires empathy and humility.
One has to realize that we can't know the things we don't know, which includes the fact that we can't always trust our own beliefs and opinions because we might be relying on faulty or incomplete information, or we might be suffering from a mental health problem, whether we are aware of it or not.
"As a rule, strong feelings about issues do not emerge from deep understanding." -Sloman and Fernbach
Papers saying that lead in petrol was totally safe were "published research", as were the papers saying that replacing tetraethyl lead with benzine made it safer.
Both of those turned out to be pretty majorly wrong, but they were "published research".
I don’t expect it to ever go out of the public consciousness. Like other things that were never real like Stockholm Syndrome I suspect it’s just stuck in the zeitgeist now.
It seems like the overlap between "real psychological effect" and "subtle enough that it requires research to discover" is vanishingly small. I guess that's not really surprising.
If a specific novice is over-confident and out of their depth, we say “Dunning-Kruger”
If a specific is under-confident and performing better than their self-estimate, that’s not commonly considered Dunning Kruger, in the colloquial use. It’s called imposter syndrome, or not labeled at all.
The researchers aren’t really disagreeing with that. They found that novices had a wider range of self-estimates of their performance than experienced people. So in the novice group you were more likely to find someone who was grossly over-confident in their abilities, but you also found people who underestimated themselves.
> instead showed that both experts and novices underestimate and overestimate their skills with the same frequency. “It’s just that experts do that over a narrower range,” he wrote to me.
Which doesn’t precisely contradict the idea that among novices you can find people who overestimate their skills. Which is how it’s commonly used.
So I can believe it’s a statistical wash when averaging across all subjects. But I never considered the common use of Dunning-Kruger to be applied to averaged groups of people. It was always brought out for those outliers on the long tail of the novice grout who thought didn’t even know what they didn’t know.
I'm at the point honestly, where I don't even consider psychology to be a science anymore.
Do you have a source for this?
Besides, deciding what is and isn’t science is a question for the philosophy of science, not science itself.
Physics on the other hand is hard as in unyielding. It is easy to figure out boundaries of physics and map out what is and isn't true, and the few cases were we made a mistake everyone can agree a mistake was made and that formulas needs to be updated since physics is so extremely hard that even a tiny error will get noticed.
Hope that clears it up, physics isn't hard as in difficult, its hard as in rigid. And psychology is soft, not easy.
So, your statement doesn't make sense at all in this discussion, they just said psychology has soft traits, and then you say "ok, so its hard since its soft!". No, soft is difficult, not hard.
So for example, physics is like describing the shape of a metal spoon, and psychology is like describing the shape of a pillow. You can see how describing the shape of the pillow is massively more difficult, because its not fixed, so you have to come up with a language to describe all the ways it can deform and how that would work.
Also, negative knowledge comes in two flavours, what you know that you don't know and what you don't know that you don't know. There it may be ground for that effect, but also changes in culture may affect that, specially with exposure to internet/global culture and attitudes, that may make you more aware of what you don't know, and stories of success/fail for taking the wrong approach.
Cut out 60% of the useless text, and focus on explaining why random data should look like that.
Can they measure things or do they just guess? Are they willing to seek evidence? Even if evidence is immediately available will they use it? Everybody has bias, but is their bias primarily self-oriented?
The consequences for poor objectivity are profound and measurable, but then its an invisible failure for people that struggle with this in the first place. In many industries poor objectivity can result in termination, law suits, criminal penalties, physical harm, and more. Software just seems to pretend this is vapor.
I think the only conclusion you can draw from that plot is everyone thinks they'll be in the third quartile.
I find references to the effect in pop culture are almost always used in an insulting, smug manner.
That being said I loved the mercury/Glasgow explanation. Anecdotally I see that all the time.
It's a sort of recursive Dunning-Kruger effect.
This makes some sense. If people are asked to guess a number between 1 and 6 and then roll a die, the people who roll low are more likely to overestimate and the people who roll high are more likely to underestimate. But the key is precisely how well random data mimics the effect.
UPD: probably this one https://economicsfromthetopdown.com/2022/04/08/the-dunning-k...
The article in the post is older though
Because on the surface, it doesn't make any sense for two sets of "random" numbers between 0-100 selected in pairs to deviate from each other based on whether the first number in the pair was low or not. You would not expect the first number chosen in a pair to influence the second number. Whether the first number was between 0-25 or 76-100, you would expect the second number to be about 50.
So this is obviously some sort of structured randomness that may be entirely justifiable, but the only way to find that out would be to read the two articles that this article purports to summarize for the layman. Instead there's over 1300 words of slop before this sentence, then nearly 700 words of slop after this sentence. Turns out we don't need AI for this. Speaking of random, I don't think that 2000 words is random.
- people not skilled in a thing are bad at estimating their skills
- people are generally bad at estimating their skills
- people skilled in a particular areas often feel they are intellectually fit in other areas
Out of these three I feel like there's some truth in it, at least anecdotally.
This I think is a separate phenomenon, maybe Nobel Disease but there might be a more general term, for example that includes celebrities.
I can’t remember of DK suggests some sort of effect where the expert has undue self-doubt, though…
"I seem, then, in just this little thing to be wiser than this man at any rate, that what I do not know I do not think I know either."
And of course there's a relevant xkcd: https://xkcd.com/2501/
root-parent•43m ago
salynchnew•38m ago
But really, the article seems to be going out of the way to make the author's particular point... but reads to me that the original paper is often understood... it simply shows that "specialists who are very knowledgeable about a subject are more likely to accurately identify gaps in their own knoweldge, when compared to any population less knoweldgeable on the same subject."
For example, I am apparently the most knowledgeable birder in my family. I've taken graduate-level ornithology courses, identify a fair number of N. American birds by their calls, etc. However, I recognize that I know nothing about birds compared to anyone who actually works in the field with them... I don't know enough to even estimate what I don't know.