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OpenCiv3: Open-source, cross-platform reimagining of Civilization III

https://openciv3.org/
530•klaussilveira•9h ago•146 comments

The Waymo World Model

https://waymo.com/blog/2026/02/the-waymo-world-model-a-new-frontier-for-autonomous-driving-simula...
860•xnx•15h ago•519 comments

How we made geo joins 400× faster with H3 indexes

https://floedb.ai/blog/how-we-made-geo-joins-400-faster-with-h3-indexes
72•matheusalmeida•1d ago•13 comments

Show HN: Look Ma, No Linux: Shell, App Installer, Vi, Cc on ESP32-S3 / BreezyBox

https://github.com/valdanylchuk/breezydemo
180•isitcontent•9h ago•21 comments

Monty: A minimal, secure Python interpreter written in Rust for use by AI

https://github.com/pydantic/monty
182•dmpetrov•10h ago•80 comments

Show HN: I spent 4 years building a UI design tool with only the features I use

https://vecti.com
294•vecti•11h ago•130 comments

Dark Alley Mathematics

https://blog.szczepan.org/blog/three-points/
70•quibono•4d ago•13 comments

Microsoft open-sources LiteBox, a security-focused library OS

https://github.com/microsoft/litebox
343•aktau•16h ago•168 comments

Sheldon Brown's Bicycle Technical Info

https://www.sheldonbrown.com/
339•ostacke•15h ago•90 comments

Hackers (1995) Animated Experience

https://hackers-1995.vercel.app/
434•todsacerdoti•17h ago•226 comments

Show HN: If you lose your memory, how to regain access to your computer?

https://eljojo.github.io/rememory/
237•eljojo•12h ago•147 comments

An Update on Heroku

https://www.heroku.com/blog/an-update-on-heroku/
373•lstoll•16h ago•252 comments

Delimited Continuations vs. Lwt for Threads

https://mirageos.org/blog/delimcc-vs-lwt
13•romes•4d ago•2 comments

Unseen Footage of Atari Battlezone Arcade Cabinet Production

https://arcadeblogger.com/2026/02/02/unseen-footage-of-atari-battlezone-cabinet-production/
6•videotopia•3d ago•0 comments

PC Floppy Copy Protection: Vault Prolok

https://martypc.blogspot.com/2024/09/pc-floppy-copy-protection-vault-prolok.html
41•kmm•4d ago•3 comments

Show HN: ARM64 Android Dev Kit

https://github.com/denuoweb/ARM64-ADK
14•denuoweb•1d ago•2 comments

How to effectively write quality code with AI

https://heidenstedt.org/posts/2026/how-to-effectively-write-quality-code-with-ai/
220•i5heu•12h ago•162 comments

Why I Joined OpenAI

https://www.brendangregg.com/blog/2026-02-07/why-i-joined-openai.html
91•SerCe•5h ago•75 comments

Show HN: R3forth, a ColorForth-inspired language with a tiny VM

https://github.com/phreda4/r3
62•phreda4•9h ago•11 comments

Learning from context is harder than we thought

https://hy.tencent.com/research/100025?langVersion=en
162•limoce•3d ago•82 comments

Introducing the Developer Knowledge API and MCP Server

https://developers.googleblog.com/introducing-the-developer-knowledge-api-and-mcp-server/
38•gfortaine•7h ago•11 comments

I spent 5 years in DevOps – Solutions engineering gave me what I was missing

https://infisical.com/blog/devops-to-solutions-engineering
127•vmatsiiako•14h ago•53 comments

Female Asian Elephant Calf Born at the Smithsonian National Zoo

https://www.si.edu/newsdesk/releases/female-asian-elephant-calf-born-smithsonians-national-zoo-an...
18•gmays•4h ago•2 comments

Understanding Neural Network, Visually

https://visualrambling.space/neural-network/
261•surprisetalk•3d ago•35 comments

I now assume that all ads on Apple news are scams

https://kirkville.com/i-now-assume-that-all-ads-on-apple-news-are-scams/
1029•cdrnsf•19h ago•428 comments

FORTH? Really!?

https://rescrv.net/w/2026/02/06/associative
55•rescrv•17h ago•18 comments

Show HN: Smooth CLI – Token-efficient browser for AI agents

https://docs.smooth.sh/cli/overview
83•antves•1d ago•60 comments

WebView performance significantly slower than PWA

https://issues.chromium.org/issues/40817676
18•denysonique•6h ago•2 comments

Zlob.h 100% POSIX and glibc compatible globbing lib that is faste and better

https://github.com/dmtrKovalenko/zlob
5•neogoose•2h ago•1 comments

I'm going to cure my girlfriend's brain tumor

https://andrewjrod.substack.com/p/im-going-to-cure-my-girlfriends-brain
109•ray__•6h ago•54 comments
Open in hackernews

Disabling Intel Graphics Security Mitigation Boosts GPU Compute Performance 20%

https://www.phoronix.com/news/Disable-Intel-Gfx-Security-20p
84•rcarmo•7mo ago

Comments

rurban•7mo ago
And re-enables CVE-2019-0155?

Intel researchers discovered that Intel graphics processors allowed userspace to modify page table entries via writes to MMIO from the Blitter Command Streamer and exposed kernel memory information, resulting in possible privilege escalation and information disclosure vulnerabilities. A local user could use this issue to escalate their privileges on the local machine.

It's i915.mitigations

Lindby•7mo ago
They mention that there are mitigations in the kernel nowadays, so the mitigations they turned off here are now redundant. But I'm uncertain if that refers to the same cve that you mention.
simoncion•7mo ago
> It's i915.mitigations

Since you're doing the research, you tell us. Is NEO_DISABLE_MITIGATIONS (the flag mentioned in TFA) related to i915.mitigations, and if so, how?

TFA mentions that Intel ships prebuilt driver packages with this NEO_... flag set, and that Canonical and Intel programmers talked at some length about the flag.

jeroenhd•7mo ago
Based on the comments and the article, it seems like Intel is relying on a patched kernel so that the mitigations at the GPU driver stack are no longer necessary. You get security warnings if you try to run the unpatched GPU stack without a patched kernel.

If my interpretation is correct, that means as long as you're using an up-to-date, patched kernel with standard mitigations enabled, the extra security layer Intel added is no longer necessary. It could expose another bug not yet covered by patches, though, as the heavy-handed patch probably also prevented more security issues.

phoronixrly•7mo ago
> After discussion between Intel and Canonical’s security teams, we are in agreement that Spectre no longer needs to be mitigated for the GPU at the Compute Runtime level. At this point, Spectre has been mitigated in the kernel...
bayindirh•7mo ago
From what I read, the disabled mitigations are not even in the driver, but in the compute stack which drives the GPU. Since the mitigations are moved to kernel and driver levels, compute stack mitigations are redundant and too heavy handed.

So, they decided to remove this (IIUC third) level now.

CjHuber•7mo ago
Is it not a known fact that these mitigations cause a significant performance drop? I have never heard anyone assuming otherwise
bilekas•7mo ago
That's not debated and nobody mentioned that it's a 'surprise' there is a perf hit.

The topic is related to now being the time to disable it as there seems to be no need for it anymore due to a kernel patch, as well as Intel themselves publishing upstream without these.

> Intel themselves have enabled this flag in their builds available on their Github release page upstream."

> At this point, Spectre has been mitigated in the kernel, and a clear warning from the Compute Runtime build serves as a notification for those running modified kernels without those patches.

phoronixrly•7mo ago
Source if you wish to skip the clickbait, blogspam and toxic comments: https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/intel-compute-runt...

I also propose the title here be changed to 'Security mitigations in intel-compute-runtime no longer needed, disabling brings 20% boost' because as it currently is it misleads that Canonical is reopening the Spectre vulnerability in the GPU for performance's sake. It's not. While there, I'd say update the link to point to the source.

Relevant quote:

> After discussion between Intel and Canonical’s security teams, we are in agreement that Spectre no longer needs to be mitigated for the GPU at the Compute Runtime level. At this point, Spectre has been mitigated in the kernel...

gotoeleven•7mo ago
A question for people who are security experts: do you think the model of a computer having limited users and privileged users, with a user gaining privileged access being a massive security problem, is really tenable? The CPU/GPU are shared resources on a machine and isolating the work they do by user is quite difficult.

Would it really be infeasible to simply design compute systems under the assumption that all users can get root access? Most of these vulnerabilities can be mitigated for free by not giving any access to users you wouldn't mind having root access.

mschuster91•7mo ago
> The CPU/GPU are shared resources on a machine and isolating the work they do by user is quite difficult.

The problem is, users aren't even the threat boundary any more. Some classes of attacks like Rowhammer have been successfully exploited from Javascript.

ospray•7mo ago
Its more like we build computers that way to protect people from running code they shouldn't and limiting the blast radius if they do. A lot of the protections that pushed iOS zero click jailbreak exploit chains to the $10 million plus range impact capability and performance heavily. However you do have a good user experience that "just works" and keeps people safe. Run as sudo no pass if want man just for many that's to much risk.
lotharcable•7mo ago
Not a security expert here...

But Discretionary Access Controls is a standard part of OS design for a very long time.

It is certainly possible to go back to DOS-days and run all your programs without controls as terminate and stay resident programs. But that would be awfully inconvenient.

The concept of "users" isn't just for human users. It is used to do things like prevent your web server from being able to read and edit your password files and such things.

ytpete•7mo ago
I'm assuming what they are thinking along the lines of is not that we'd do away with the notion of privilege levels, but more that privilege boundaries would become 1:1 with hardware boundaries. So perhaps you'd have a dedicated CPU core with its own isolated cache for running the kernel, or that sort of thing. Almost like multiple separate systems communicating across client-server boundaries.

I guess the question for me though (as neither a deep expert in security nor low-level hw) is, how much less efficient would that be than the kinds of mitigations used today for shared hardware? If it's far more guaranteed-safe and the cost is only just a bit higher than today's mitigations... that would be interesting indeed.

Rakshith•7mo ago
how do we disable it?
washadjeffmad•7mo ago
depends on your boot configuration. if you use systemd-boot, use kernelstub -a "i915.mitigations=off". if you have /etc/default/grub, add it as a kernel parameter then update-grub.
nodesocket•7mo ago
Just set this on my MiniPC running Debian which runs Jellyfin.

    sudo nano /etc/default/grub
Look for GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX_DEFAULT and add: i915.mitigations=off

    GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX_DEFAULT="quiet i915.mitigations=off"
Then:

    sudo update-grub
    sudo reboot
To verify:

    cat /proc/cmdline
pabs3•7mo ago
Wonder if it would be possible to enable them at runtime instead, based on whether the current Linux kernel boot has mitigated them or not.