It's wild to me that people entrust a third-party CI system with API secrets, and then also entrust that same system to run "actions" provided by other third parties.
the CI system itself encourages you to import random third party code into your CI workflow, based on mutable tags
which then receives full privileges
the entire thing is insane
so very few use it
it's not made obvious that the tag isn't immutable
although you might be happy with the contents of what you've imported right now, who says it won't be malicious in a year's time
people inadvertently give full control of their build and all their secrets to whoever controls that repository (now, and in the future)
making it easy to do the right thing is an important part of API design and building secure systems, and these CI systems fail miserably there
I’m also glad to see yet another case where having Trusted Publishing configured would have prevented the attack. That’s a cheap defense that has proven effective once again!
miketheman•3d ago